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 This paper studies the interaction effects between monetary policy actions and house price 
changes in China. I focus on the impact of M2 money supply on house prices in Beijing, the capital 
of China. A VAR model is constructed and shows that an M2 money supply shock has a significant 
positive impact on Beijing house prices from the fifth to the ninth month, whereas a house price 
shock has no significant impact on M2 money supply. To verify whether the impact of money 
supply is robust in different Chinese cities, I develop another VAR model to observe the housing 
market in Shenzhen, a first-tier city in southern China. The results show that an M2 money supply 
shock has only a small significant positive impact on Shenzhen house prices at one month, 





Since the 2008 financial crisis, China has implemented fiscal stimulus programs and 
monetary policy to keep a rapid pace of economic growth. In 2009 and 2010, the annual economic 
growth rates of China were 9.2% and 10.4%, which were significantly higher than the growth rates 
of other countries during the recession. However, the loose monetary policy leads to a rapid 
expansion of lending by commercial banks, since state-owned enterprises (SOEs) borrow 
excessively for real-estate developments and infrastructure projects. Also, industries produce 
much more than the economy can demand to achieve high gross domestic product (GDP) growth, 
leading to a problem with overcapacity. Moreover, the Chinese government increases priority on 
low-skilled sectors to stimulate growth in the short term, allocating investment toward low-skilled 
industries and causing misallocation of resources. China’s housing market is one of the sectors 
that reflects the issues with credit booms, overcapacity, and capital misallocation. 
Since China implemented a housing privatization reform and transferred the property rights 
from the state to individuals in 1998, China’s housing market had grown, and house prices in the 
first-tier cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, had more than tripled by 2010. When the 
Chinese stock market was nearing its peak in 2015, the increase in house prices accelerated. In 
2016, based on the research by the economic consultancy firm Longview Economics, only housing 
in Silicon Valley was more expensive than that in Shenzhen. A typical home in Shenzhen costed 
approximately $800,000, while the ratio of house price to yearly income was 70 times, compared 
with around 27 times in London where housing is also known to be expensive (Clinch, 2016). 
The share of investment in China’s GDP is extraordinarily high. Lien, Wang, and Zhang 
(2016) state that China’s investment rate increased from 35.3 percent in 2000 to 48.6 percent in 
2010, while the average investment rate among the forty largest world economies excluding China 
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was just 22.4 percent in 2009. Housing investment occupies a large proportion in China’s 
investment, and the housing market has contributed significantly to China’s economic growth. As 
Yao, Luo, and Wang (2014) illustrate, when combined with the construction industry, the housing 
market contributes to more than 10 percent of GDP each year. However, although the rapid 
economic expansion has raised people’s living conditions and income levels, the growth of house 
prices outpaces the increase in income and excludes many people from the housing market. 
The surging house prices have been concerning Chinese residents and economists. In 
addition to the high economic growth and the increases in income levels, China’s monetary policy 
actions are believed to impact the housing market. The People's Bank of China (PBOC), namely 
the China’s central bank, is responsible for implementing the monetary policy of China under the 
leadership of the central government. While the Chinese government attempts to achieve high 
economic growth, Lien et al. (2016) argue that the government investment policies are leading to 
capital misallocation, because policy makers tend to distribute subsidies to prioritized industries, 
such as physical infrastructure and housing which heavily rely on low-skilled labor. For example, 
in 2008, the Chinese government launched the $586 billion fiscal stimulus package to address the 
financial crisis by increasing spending in infrastructure and housing. Meanwhile, the PBOC 
frequently increases the money supply, allowing commercial banks to issue more loans to 
stimulate economic growth. Nonetheless, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have more access to 
the loans and have greater overinvestment than non-SOEs. The SOEs tend to direct the funds to 
inefficient projects including real estate investment. The policy priority toward low-skilled sectors 
not only distorts China’s housing market, but also leads to inefficient education and job choices. 
As Lien et al. (2016) illustrate, the wage gap between high- and low-skilled workers in China's 
5	
	
labor market is shrinking. The demand for low-skilled migrant workers has increased rapidly, and 
workers with high school degrees are the most desirable group in the labor market. 
The performance of the housing market not only influences the wealth and the consumption 
decisions of households, but also implies the wellbeing of the economy. Understanding the factors 
that impact house prices is important for recognizing the implications behind the house price 
fluctuations. In addition, knowing whether monetary policy actions have a significant impact on 
house prices is essential for the government to make prudent decisions on policy settings. In this 
paper, I study the dynamic effects and causality between monetary policy and housing market in 
China. Specifically, I focus on how changes in M2 money supply influence the house prices in 
Beijing. As opposed to second- and third-tier cities, Beijing is a city where the demand for housing 
is notoriously high and house prices are conceivably sensitive to policy changes; thus, the housing 
market in Beijing serves as a representative of the housing markets in top-tier cities. I use 2006-
2016 monthly data on house prices in Beijing and money supply along with other macroeconomic 
variables, including lending rates, government expenditure, and exchange rates, to build the VAR 
model. After that, I conduct two robustness checks. First, I replace Beijing house price data with 
Shenzhen house price data to develop another VAR model. Compared with Beijing, Shenzhen is 
a southern first-tier city with less pollution and higher per capital income; therefore, one can make 
a comparison between the results from the two housing markets. Second, I replace money supply 
with consumer price indices (CPI) in both models to observe whether the impacts of CPI and other 
variables are consistent with the original results. Furthermore, this paper makes additional 
contributions to the research on China's housing market. It is worth noting that fiscal stimulus 
plans and exchange rate fluctuations also occurred in China between 2006 and 2016; therefore, 
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this study takes these two factors into account, investigating whether the house price fluctuations 
are due to changes in money supply or in fiscal policy and exchange rates. 
The results show that money supply has a positive effect on house prices, although the size 
of the effect varies due to institutional differences between cities. In Beijing housing market, a 
money supply shock has a significant positive impact from the fifth to the ninth month; however, 
a house price shock has no significant effect on money supply. These findings suggest that a 
unilateral relationship from money supply and house prices exists in China. When compared with 
Beijing house prices, Shenzhen house prices are more sensitive to lending rates than money supply; 
lending rates have a significant negative impact on Shenzhen house prices from the second to the 
seventh month, while a money supply shock has only a small positive impact which becomes 
statistically insignificant after one month. When money supply is replaced with CPI in both models, 
most of the results are similar to those of the original models. In addition, this paper contributes to 
previous studies by revealing that a government spending shock has a positive impact on Beijing 
house prices, while the shock has insignificant effect on Shenzhen house prices. Also, both models 
show that there is no pronounced relationship between exchange rates and house prices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents literature that discusses 
the determinants of house prices. Section 3 discusses methodology including theoretical 
framework, data, and model. Section 4 presents the results including the impulse responses and 
the variance decomposition. Section 5 conducts robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the policy 
implications of the study. Section 7 concludes and points out the limitations of the study. 
 
2. Literature review 
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 Numerous factors can affect house prices. Kholodilin and Ulbricht (2015) study the urban 
house prices in 48 large European cities, showing that population density, mortgage per capita, 
and income inequality have positive effects on house prices, whereas unemployment has a negative 
effect. Also, Fierro, Fullerton, and Doujuan-Callejo (2009) find that lot size, floor space, number 
of bathrooms, parking spaces, guard posts, and proximity to commercial centers significantly 
increase house prices. Hindsley, Hamilton, and Morgan (2012) study the influence of Gulf of 
Mexico, namely an ocean basin, on house prices in Pinellas County, Florida. They show that 
homebuyers prefer larger total views and larger continuous view segments, and homes in closer 
proximity to the Gulf of Mexico have higher view valuations. However, only considering these 
non-policy factors is not sufficient to explain the drastic increase in China’s house prices in recent 
decade. China's monetary policy is also believed to influence the housing market. 
China has frequently implemented fiscal stimulus plans and monetary policy changes since 
the 2008 financial crisis. The two main monetary policy instruments that the PBOC relies on are 
reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cuts and open market operations (OMOs). An RRR cut is to lower 
the amount of reserves that commercial banks are required to hold; in March of 2016, RRR was 
moved down to 17% from 19.5% due to slowing economic growth and continued capital outflows. 
However, a low RRR can trigger currency depreciation and thus capital outflows. When China 
experienced yuan's declines in 2016, the PBOC became reluctant to cut the RRR and relied more 
upon the OMOs, injecting or withdrawing cash from the banking system through bond repurchase 
agreements with commercial banks. Both monetary policy actions play important roles in 
increasing money supply. It is conceivable that house prices tend to increase with money supply 
in China. As Chang et al. (2013) argue, because the Chinese government tends to achieve fast 
economic growth in the short run, the government provides explicit and implicit guarantees for 
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loans to SOEs to boost economic activities; nevertheless, the SOEs tend to invest in the property 
market due to the high profit. Consequently, an increase in money supply encourages the SOEs to 
participate in the housing market. Meanwhile, local governments own the land and tend to generate 
high revenues from the sale of land use rights. When housing investment and demand increase, 
the shortage of land leads to a rise in land prices, which in turn causes an increase in house prices. 
The following subsections review literature that discusses the influences of money supply, 
credit constraints, and other non-monetary policy parameters on house prices in China. It is worth 
noting that the concepts of monetary growth and an easing of credit constraints may overlap, but 
they differ in whether new money is provided in the economy. 
 
2.1. Money supply 
 Lastrapes (2002) estimates the dynamic effects of money supply shocks on aggregate house 
prices using 1963-1999 monthly data on the US housing market and the macro economy. He first 
employs a VAR model, which is useful for studying the correlations between economic variables, 
to show that a money supply shock increases new house prices by 0.1% initially and by 0.7% after 
a year and a half. However, the response of new house sales is much larger than that of prices; new 
houses sold rise by 2.5% at the time of the shock and by 3.5% in three to four months. After new 
house data are replaced with sale and price data for existing owner-occupied homes, results from 
a similar approach show that existing home prices respond quicker, but existing home sales 
respond slower, to money supply shocks. Next, Lastrapes (2002) develops a dynamic equilibrium 
model to interpret the transmission channels of money supply shocks. The simulated theoretical 
responses of house prices to money supply shocks reveal that money supply shocks raise real house 
prices via effects on interest rates and inflation; low interest rates encourage people to borrow more 
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to purchase houses, and high inflation motivates people to invest in housing to secure their wealth. 
In response to the increase in housing demand, house prices rise immediately and then decline 
gradually to a steady-state level higher than the pre-shock values. 
Although Lastrapes (2002) provides an understanding about the relationship between 
monetary policy and housing market, the paper does not analyze the China's housing market, which 
may be different than the housing markets in the US and European countries due to the economic 
conditions and the policies in China. Koivu (2012) and Tan and Chen (2013) study the housing 
markets and the wealth channel, namely the effect of asset prices on consumption, in China. They 
investigate whether China's monetary policy impacts either housing or stock prices, which in turn 
influence household consumption. Both studies employ a structural VAR model with variables 
such as household income, household consumption, CPI, an indicator of monetary policy, and 
asset prices. While studies on developed economies use a policy interest rate as the monetary 
policy indicator, Koivu (2012) and Tan and Chen (2013) argue that interest rates have limited 
effects on Chinese economy, because China’s interest rates have been under administrative control. 
Lending decisions of commercial banks depend more on official authorities than on interest rates. 
Moreover, investment decisions of individuals and firms are barely affected by lending rates due 
to the high profit; house prices never fall whenever PBOC raises the rates in recent ten years. 
Instead of interest rates, M2 is used as the indicator of monetary policy in Koivu (2012) and Tan 
and Chen (2013), because the PBOC closely monitors movements in M2 for its quarterly reports. 
The results from Koivu (2012) show that money supply is reduced after a positive shock in CPI, a 
rise in real income or consumption, or a positive shock in either stock or residential prices, 
suggesting that a loosening of China's monetary policy leads to higher asset prices. Nevertheless, 
the effects of asset prices on household income and consumption are small, implying that higher 
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house prices may force households to save more income to buy an apartment and hence decrease 
consumption. Similarly, Tan and Chen (2013) reveal that when M2 increases by 1%, house prices 
rise by about 0.5%, compared with CPI by 0.2% and GDP by 0.05%. In addition, a house price 
shock increases M2, GDP, and CPI, and the effect on M2 is much larger than on GDP and CPI, 
highlighting the interaction effects between monetary policy and house prices. 
One remark is that the results from Tan and Chen (2013) and Koivu (2012) are obtained 
before 2015, when the PBOC controlled interest rates by setting a deposit rate ceiling and a lending 
rate floor; however, the caps were removed in 2015, after which the rates were more market-based 
and expected to have a greater influence on the economy. Hence, the conclusions about interest 
rates in both studies may not be relevant to the current Chinese economy. In addition, both studies 
do not take into account the effects of fiscal stimulus plans. The Chinese government implemented 
a large fiscal stimulus program in 2008 to increase spending in infrastructure and housing; 
therefore, fiscal policy may also play an important role in influencing the housing market. 
 
2.2. Credit constraints 
 While Koivu (2012) and Tan and Chen (2013) argue that interest rates have no effect on 
Chinese economy, some studies show that credit constraints can influence house prices. Chen, 
Chou, and Wu (2013) observe the recent house price fluctuations in the UK and the US. They 
hypothesize that reactions of house prices to monetary policy changes in an economy depend on 
the tightness of the credit market. They construct a simple dynamic general equilibrium model to 
observe how borrowers, lenders, and the central bank make decisions based on various economic 
variables. The model shows that the effects of monetary policy on house prices vary under the 
normal credit regime and the credit boom regime. A temporary expansionary monetary shock can 
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lead to an easing of credit constraints, allowing a borrower to negotiate more loans for investment 
in housing; thus, the shock initially has a positive effect on house prices, and the effect is larger 
under the credit boom regime. However, in the next period when the shock ends, borrowers are 
highly indebted, so they curtail investment in housing. The anticipated cutbacks in housing 
investment cause a decline in house prices, and this decline is faster under the credit boom regime. 
Chen et al. (2013) use the threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) model to further demonstrate 
the impacts of the tightness of the credit market on house prices. They study the UK housing 
market using 1993-2008 data for output, short-term interest rates, CPI, real house prices, and a 
measure of credit conditions. The results confirm that in the credit boom periods, a monetary policy 
shock generates stronger initial impacts but has less persistent effects on house prices.  
 Similar to Chen et al. (2013), Carrington and Madsen (2014) study how willingness to lend 
affects house prices. They obtain data for willingness to lend of domestic banks and foreign banks’ 
agencies in the US from 1966 to present and investigate how credit constraints influence house 
prices. They develop a Tobin’s Q model, which represents house investors who face credit and 
income constraints in their optimization problems. This theoretical model shows that during an 
unanticipated expansion in credit supply, demand for housing increases. Because housing stocks 
have not adjusted, house prices initially rise and exceed the cost of building. However, the profit 
causes housing stocks to gradually increase and eventually meet the excess demand; thus, in the 
long run, total housing stock increases, but the value of housing declines. In other words, interest 
rate and demand shocks triggered by a credit expansion have only temporary effects on house 
prices, whereas a permanent easing of credit constraints can permanently lower house prices.  
 While the findings from Carrington and Madsen (2014) are relevant to the US housing 
market, they may not be applicable to the China's housing market, in which house prices continue 
12	
	
to rise regardless of the tightness of the credit market in recent decade. Shen, Lee, Wu, and Guo 
(2016) focus on the housing market in China. Generally, credit booms are believed to cause the 
increases in house prices; nevertheless, Shen et al. (2016) argue whether the housing boom leads 
to the credit boom or it is the other way around. It is reasonable that a credit boom can induce a 
housing boom because large amounts of funds are injected into the housing market, and a housing 
boom can lead to credit growth because the demand for credit increases with the demand for 
housing. Shen et al. (2016) first reveal that a cointegrated relationship exists between the credit-
to-GDP ratio and house prices; that is, the two variables follow random walks but exhibit a 
relationship when formed as a linear combination. The cointegration suggests the use of a panel 
error correction model. After that, 1999-2012 credit and housing data from Chinese provinces and 
municipalities is collected. Results show that the bi-directional causality exists between the credit 
and housing markets; however, the effect of property prices on credit appears to be stronger than 
the effect of credit on property prices. It is conceivable that the Chinese government tends to permit 
the growth of the housing market by allowing credit expansions. Because the surging house prices 
can lead to a housing bubble, the government needs to inject considerable amount of funds to save 
the housing market, resulting in a credit boom. One drawback is that the paper fails to analyze 
whether the changes in credit and house prices are caused by the missing third variable. If a third 
variable, such as the population size or the policy setting, is impacting the credit and housing 
markets, then the relationship between the two markets found in the paper may be invalid. 
 
2.3. Non-monetary policy factors 
 Besides monetary policy shocks and credit expansions, non-monetary factors such as 
marriage and the lack of investment opportunities also increase housing demand in China. Zhang, 
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An, and Yu (2012) examine the effect of marriage on house prices. China has faced a growing 
gender imbalance in newborns since the 1980s due to the traditional preference for the birth of 
boys. As the sex ratio, namely the male-to-female ratio, rises, Chinese parents with a son raise 
their savings for housing purchases to improve their son’s attractiveness for marriage, because 
owning a house is a symbol of social status and a pre-requisite for marriage. It is feasible that 
China’s gender imbalance causes the increases in saving rate and house prices. Zhang et al. (2012) 
first observe the relationship between sex ratios and house price movements. Results from a linear 
regression show that a rise in the sex ratios, as well as income and population, has no significant 
effect on variations in house prices in China during 1998-2009. Zhang et al. (2012) explain that 
parents' decisions on housing purchases do not depend on marriage, because parents are uncertain 
where their son will work and thus unable to buy houses in advance. However, this explanation is 
not convincing, since parents can purchase houses only when their son decides to get married. 
Also, one can argue that sex ratios cannot be an indicator of the competition in marriage market; 
thus, using sex ratios to conclude the effect of marriage on house prices may lead to biases. 
People believe that purchasing houses is one of the safest ways to invest in China. Chen 
and Wen (2014) investigate the rising housing investment and highlight the puzzling combination 
of three features in China’s economy: real house prices outpacing income for a decade, a high 
vacancy rate, and a high rate of return to capital. They use a two-period overlapping-generations 
model to describe a house price bubble that grows faster than GDP and develop a theory for 
China’s housing boom. The model shows that due to the expected strong future housing demand, 
the expectation that holding housing today can yield large capital gains tomorrow encourages 
housing investment. The rate of return to capital is high because labor is being reallocated from 
unproductive to productive firms. However, cheap surplus labor is expected to be exhausted, and 
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a decrease in returns to capital will follow. Such trajectory of returns to capital leads entrepreneurs 
to invest in the housing market and view housing as an alternative store of value; therefore, house 
prices continue to grow faster than aggregate income before the labor reallocation ends. Chen and 
Wen (2014) further assert that such a growing housing bubble may crowd out productive capital 
investment; nevertheless, it may not be desirable to burst the bubble since the housing market 
serves as a store of value and hence secures the wealth of entrepreneurs. 
 While many studies investigate the housing markets at the national or provincial levels, 
Huang, Leung, and Qu (2015) focus on research at a more disaggregated level, observing the cross-
sectional variations in house prices in different Chinese cities. As previously mentioned, physical 
and locational attributes can affect the price of a housing unit. Huang et al. (2015) study not only 
the relationship between credit growth and house prices, but also the effects of local amenities, 
such as climatic and geological environments and access to education and healthcare. Amenities 
can directly affect house prices, because people are willing to pay for better amenities. Likewise, 
amenities can indirectly affect house prices, since better amenities attract more capable people and 
raise the aggregate income of the city. To distinguish the direct and the indirect effects, a two-step 
regression is applied. To measure the quality of amenities, Huang et al. (2015) use data on factors 
such as temperature, days with good air quality, number of universities, and number of doctors. 
The regression results show that crime rate, education quality, green space coverage, and urban 
crowding have highly significant effects on house prices. Meanwhile, credit and real income have 
positive effects on house prices, but long-term interest rates have no significant effect, which 
supports the argument from Koivu (2012). Furthermore, credit and amenities are interrelated. The 
influence of credit on housing prices varies across the levels of amenity, and house prices are less 
sensitive to credit expansion in cities with better amenities. Nonetheless, this finding implies that 
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instead of money supply and credit shocks, the levels of amenity cause the surging house prices in 
top-tier Chinese cities which provide better education and healthcare, contradicting the expectation 
that monetary policy is the main driving factor of house prices. 
 
2.4. Contributions to previous studies 
 Following by Koivu (2012) and Tan and Chen (2013), I apply a VAR model with data on 
M2 money supply to study the house price fluctuations in Beijing. Because Beijing is a first-tier 
city where housing demand is notoriously high and house prices are conceivably sensitive to policy 
changes, the housing market in Beijing serves as a representative of the housing markets in top-
tier cities. In addition, although both Koivu (2012) and Tan and Chen (2013) argue that interest 
rates are directed by Chinese authorities and hence have limited effect on the economy, I include 
interest rates in this study due to two reasons. First, interest rates can reflect the tightness of credit, 
which, as Chen et al. (2013) and Carrington and Madsen (2013) illustrate, can influence house 
prices. Second, the Chinese government has ended its administrative control of interest rates since 
2015, so interest rates should have a greater influence on the current China’s economy. 
 Although numerous studies discuss the effects of money supply and credit constraints, few 
of them have models that include the exchange rates of RMB to dollar, which can affect foreign 
investment that may flow to the housing market. Only Liu and Hu (2011) use a VAR model to 
reveal a unilateral causal relationship from house price changes to RMB exchange rate movements, 
suggesting that the housing market can impact foreign investment and hence the demand for the 
yuan. In addition, Nakamura (2008) investigates the exchange rate pass-through, namely the 
responsiveness of prices to exchange rates, in retail and wholesale. She uses data on price and 
quantity series for about 7,000 grocery stores across the US to observe the price variation across 
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products, stores, and cities. The variance decomposition, which determines the variation in prices 
that each factor accounts for, shows that retail-level demand and supply shocks can explain the 
price fluctuations. Importantly, retail prices are not closely linked to standard price determinants 
in macroeconomics and international economics such as wages, productivity, and exchange rates. 
Although Nakamura (2008) does not analyze the influences of exchange rate fluctuations on a 
housing market, the results imply that the variation in house prices may be caused by changes in 
domestic demand and supply rather than exchange rate movements. Nevertheless, house prices 
may be different than retail and wholesale prices, because housing is a durable good that can be 
viewed as an investment. Further research on the relationship between exchange rates and house 
prices is needed. China has experienced depreciation in currency and capital outflows since 2015; 
therefore, I include the exchange rates of Chinese yuan to US dollar in my model to not only 
investigate the exchange rate pass-through into house prices, but also examine whether the changes 
in house prices are due to money supply or exchange rate fluctuations. 
 Moreover, Tan and Chen (2013) and Koivu (2012) fail to take into account the impacts of 
fiscal stimulus programs on the housing market in China, while those fiscal policies are aimed to 
increase spending in housing. Previous studies have investigated the impact of fiscal policy in 
different countries. Afonso and Sousa (2009) collect quarterly data spanning from 1970 to 2007 
on government spending and revenue, GDP, unemployment rate, average cost of financing the 
debt, and house prices, and they apply a structural VAR model to investigate the link between 
fiscal policy shocks and movements in asset markets. Results show that a government spending 
shock has a large and persistent positive impact on house prices in the US, the UK, and Italy. 
Nonetheless, few studies are concerned about the fiscal policy in China, while China’s fiscal 
stimulus plans may play an important role in driving the house prices. It is possible that the surging 
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house prices are caused by fiscal policy instead of monetary policy; thus, I include government 
expenditure in my model to measure the impact of fiscal policy. 
  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
 Because of the monetary transmission mechanism, monetary policy decisions are believed 
to influence asset prices, namely stock and house prices, and general economic conditions. 
Specifically, monetary policy decisions often influence aggregate demand, interest rates, and 
amounts of money and credit, which in turn affect the housing market. For example, the monetary 
transmission mechanism can occur through the interest rate channels; changes in interest rates, 
namely the costs of borrowing, can influence decisions on consumption and investment in the 
housing market. As previously mentioned, both Koivu (2012) and Tan and Chen (2013) assert that 
house price fluctuations are related to monetary policy changes. Their findings are consistent with 
the monetary transmission mechanism. There are two prevalent phenomena in China. First, due to 
the continued price increase in the past decade and the high return of buying a house, people form 
a belief that purchasing houses is one of the safest ways to invest. Second, the Chinese government 
provides explicit and implicit guarantees for loans to SOEs and directs capital into physical 
infrastructure and housing to achieve fast and visible output results. These phenomena imply that 
when the PBOC adopts a loosening of monetary policy by implementing RRR cuts or OMOs, the 
increase in money supply and the easing of credit constraints are expected to drive the housing 
demand and investment, which in turn cause an increase in house prices. 
 Similar to Tan and Chen (2013) and Koivu (2012), I consider M2 money supply as the 
proxy for China's monetary policy. As illustrated before, the two main monetary policy instruments 
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of the PBOC are RRR cuts and OMOs, both of which are aimed to increase the supply of money 
in the economy. Meanwhile, the PBOC relies less upon adjustments on interest rates. Although 
interest rates are not the focus in this study and not considered as the optimal proxy, changes in 
interest rates are still viewed as monetary policy actions and expected to influence the housing 
demand. I apply a vector autoregression (VAR) model to study the relationship between monetary 
policy and house prices in China. A VAR model is ideal for this study when there exists feedback 
mechanism and dynamic effects among different variables. For example, while house prices may 
be affected by money supply and interest rates, money supply and interest rates can also be 
influenced by house prices. In addition, A VAR model relies on empirical data and less considers, 
although still needs to justify, theoretical approaches when investigating correlations between 
economic variables over time; thus, the model is useful when existing theories are inaccurate or 
based upon unrealistic assumptions. Although the monetary transmission mechanism may not 
apply to China where the financial sector is underdeveloped, the VAR model is effective in 
revealing the impacts of monetary policy actions on house prices. In particular, I study the housing 
market in Beijing. It is conceivable that the monetary transmission mechanism is more pronounced 
in top-tier cities than in low-tier cities. Because Beijing is a first-tier city where housing demand 
and supply are sensitive to policy changes, analyzing the housing market in Beijing can help to 
understand the relationship between monetary policy and house prices. 
 
3.2 Data and variables 
 2006-2016 monthly data on M2, HPI in Beijing, government expenditure, and CPI are 
retrieved from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), and 2006-2016 monthly data on 
exchange rates of Chinese yuan to one US dollar are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Economic 
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Data (FRED). Because the monthly lending rates in China are not available on several websites 
including NBS, the FRED, and the World Bank Data, I manually insert the lending rates into the 
data set by searching for the historical adjustments on the one-year lending rates between 2006 
and 2016. It is worth noting that the PBOC has adjusted the rates 25 times during that period. Both 
M2 money supply and government expenditure are accumulated values measured in 100 million 
yuan. As Figure 1 shows, M2 money supply increased persistently between 2006 and 2016, and 
the increase accelerated after 2008. Government expenditure serves as a proxy for fiscal policy; a 
rise in government expenditure is often accompanied by proactive fiscal stimulus plans. 
The HPI are the sales price indices of newly constructed commercialized buildings in 
Beijing on a month-on-month basis; a month-on-month variable means that each index is obtained 
by considering the index in the preceding month as 100. Similarly, CPI are the national consumer 
price indices including all items on a month-on-month basis. However, these two variables are not 
the desirable time-series variables. Both variables only compare the values in two consecutive 
months, but cannot compare, for example, the values in January and June; thus, both variables 
need to be converted. I subtract 100 from each index to obtain the growth rates. Next, I set the 
index in January 2006 to be 100. Then, I multiply 100 by the proper growth rates to obtain the HPI 
and CPI for other observations. After this process, HPI and CPI become variables where the base 
year is 2006. Figure 2 shows the changes in the adjusted HPI in Beijing between 2006 and 2016; 
house prices in Beijing has more than doubled since 2006. In addition, the increase in house prices 
accelerated in 2012 and in 2015, when the PBOC implemented RRR cuts to increase the supply of 
money. This observation implies that house prices may increase with money supply. 
The exchange rate indicates the ratio of Chinese yuan to one US dollar. Figure 3 shows the 
exchange rate movement between 2006 and 2016. Although the yuan had been appreciating by 
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2015, at the end of 2016, the yuan dropped to 6.94 against the dollar, which was nearly eight-year 
low. Meanwhile, the increase in Beijing house prices decelerated. This observation implies that a 
yuan's decline may negatively impact house prices. Certainly, only examining the figures cannot 
lead to a convincing conclusion. A model is needed for further analysis. 
 While some studies include a variable of GDP, income, or CPI in their VAR models, none 
of them are included in this paper, because they have high correlations with M2. The high 
correlations will result in two problems when building the VAR model. First, the collinearity will 
result in a singular matrix, namely a matrix in which two or more rows, or columns, are a linear 
combination of each other. The singular matrix will disrupt the implementation of the VAR model. 
Second, the collinearity will disrupt the interpretation of the variance decomposition. The concept 
of variance decomposition will be explained later in this paper; in short, the model will fail to 
correctly explain which variable has a greater influence on the changes in house prices because of 
the collinearity. Although the CPI and GDP variables are excluded, after using the M2 variable to 
construct two VAR models, I replace M2 with CPI to conduct robustness checks to observe 
whether the results are consistent with those of the original models. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics of each variable, and the sample size is 132. However, since the variable of government 
expenditure has five missing values, five observations have to be discarded. 
 One caveat is that time-series variables whose statistical properties such as mean, variance, 
and autocorrelation change over time are non-stationary variables. In a VAR model, non-stationary 
variables are often transformed into stationary variables. An augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
is implemented to test the stationarity of each variable. The null hypothesis is that a unit root, 
which implies non-stationarity, is present in the time series sample, and the alternative hypothesis 
is that the time series is stationary. Table 2 shows the results of the ADF test. The test fails to reject 
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the null hypothesis when checking the variables of M2 and lending rates, indicating that the two 
variables are non-stationary. As a result, a differencing technique is used to transform M2 into a 
stationary variable. Such transformation takes the first differences of M2 between two consecutive 
observations. After the transformation, the ADF test is conducted again, which shows that the M2 
variable is now stationary. Nevertheless, lending rates are not converted. The non-stationarity of 
lending rates is not severe; in fact, the modified Dickey Fuller test, which is known as the DF-GLS 
test, shows that the variable of lending rates is stationary at the 5% level. Furthermore, although 
both HPI and government expenditure are stationary variables, they are transformed into natural 
logarithms; the purpose of this transformation is to aid in the interpretation of the results of the 
VAR model instead of reducing stationarity. As Table 2 shows, the ADF test suggests that both 
HPI and government expenditure are still stationary after transformed into logs. 
 
3.3 The setup of a VAR model 
 A VAR model describes the evolution of variables over the same sample period as a linear 
function of their past values. The model in this study includes five variables: HPI, M2, lending 
rates, government expenditure, and exchange rates. To understand the setup of the VAR model, I 
first denote the five variables as 𝑦",$, 𝑦",%, 𝑦",&, 𝑦",', and 𝑦",(, where 𝑦",$ is the HPI at time 𝑡. If I 
assume that the VAR model only uses one lag, then the model creates the following regression 
function to estimate the effects of the lagged values of all the five variables on HPI: 𝑦",$ = 𝑐$ + 𝛽$$𝑦".$,$ + 𝛽$%𝑦".$,% + 𝛽$&𝑦".$,& + 𝛽$'𝑦".$,' + 𝛽$(𝑦".$,( + 𝑤",$ 
 In this function, 𝑐$ is the constant term, 𝑤",$ is the error term, and 𝛽's are the coefficients 
(Greene, 2012). The coefficients can be estimated by the appropriate approach, such as the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator or the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach; 
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the latter is used in this study. I repeat replacing 𝑦",$ with the other four variables; as a result, I end 
up with five equations that estimate how the lagged values of all variables influence the five 
dependent variables. If I combine the five equations, I obtain the following function: 𝑦" = 𝑐 + 𝐴$𝑦".$	 + 𝐴%𝑦".% + ⋯+ 𝐴3𝑦".3 + 𝑒" 
 This is the initial setup of a VAR model. 𝑦" is a  5×1 vector that collects the five variables. 𝑦".8  is called the 𝐼 -th lag of 𝑦 , representing the 𝐼 -periods back observation. The 𝐴:  are 5×5 
coefficient matrices, which represent the magnitude of the effects of the independent variables. 𝑐 
is the constant term, and 𝑒" is the error term assumed to have no correlation across time. The vector 
form of the left-hand side 𝑦" implies that each of the five variables is a dependent variable in turn. 
 The VAR model in this paper is different from those in Koivu (2012) and Tan and Chen 
(2013), who instead apply structural VAR models. A structural VAR model typically has two 
features. First, a structural model requires additional identifying assumptions based on institutional 
knowledge or economic theory, such as the utility maximization problem. Second, a structural 
model introduces economic structural shocks, which ensure that the error terms are uncorrelated. 
The uncorrelated error terms ensure that a shock to a variable is not influenced by shocks to other 
variables; thus, the model can estimate the effect of a shock while holding all other shocks constant. 
However, this study does not focus on the structural factors, and having inappropriate identifying 
assumptions cannot improve the performance of the model. Hence, this study uses an unstructured 
VAR model to merely examine how monetary policy and house prices affect each other. 
 
3.4 The GMM approach 
As mentioned above, I apply the GMM approach to estimate the coefficients in the VAR 
model. The GMM approach is useful when there exists endogeneity between variables; an 
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endogeneity problem occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term. One 
common cause of endogeneity is that at least two variables are codetermined, with each affecting 
the other. Because there exists feedback mechanism among the variables used in this study, the 
endogeneity problem is present. Also, in a time series analysis, the value of a variable in period 𝑡 
may be dependent on the values of other variables in period 𝑡 − 1. For example, it is feasible that 
government expenditure is independent of other variables within a given period, but influenced by 
changes in house prices in the preceding period. In this instance, government expenditure is 
endogenous over time. One can notice that because of the endogeneity problem, the OLS estimator 
cannot be used in this study, because it leads to biased estimates of the regression coefficients. 
To understand the implementation of the GMM, one can suppose that a population is 
defined, and the population data is in normal distribution such that the mean is 𝑢 and the variance 
is 𝜎%. Then, one of the moments, or properties, of a normal distribution is that the expected value 
of a variable 𝑋 is 𝑢, namely 𝐸 𝑋 = 𝑢. After a sample from the population is acquired, the moment 
conditions need to be recreated in the sample. That is, given data on the observable variables, the 
GMM finds values for the model parameters such that the sample moment conditions, such as 𝐸 𝑋 = 𝑢, are as close as possible to the population moment conditions (Greene, 2012). 
 
3.5 Lag length selection 
 Furthermore, the number of lags, namely 𝑝, needs to be determined. Several techniques 
can be used to identify the appropriate lag length; for example, the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), the Schwarz criterion (SBIC), and the final prediction error criterion (FRE). When more 
parameters are added to a model, the model will provide a better fit for the data points; however, 
adding excessive parameters result in a problem with overfitting and losing information about the 
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real underlying pattern. Choosing the optimal model requires considering the balance between the 
simplicity and the predictive performance of the model. In particular, the AIC method takes the 
balance into account when selecting among a finite set of models. Table 3 shows the results of the 
lag selection from different methods. In this case, both FRE and AIC suggest using a lag length of 
four, namely 𝑝 = 4. However, I use three lags, instead of four lags, in the VAR model due to two 
reasons. First, since the sample in this paper only has a size of 127, using fewer lags can prevent 
the model from overfitting. Second, 𝑝 = 3 is the next best choice proposed by FRE and AIC, so 
using three lags should not deteriorate the performance of the model. Hence, the estimation of the 
VAR model will be based on the evolution of the variables over the last three months. 
 
3.4 Formal hypothesis 
This study focuses on the relationship between M2 money supply and house prices and 
hypothesizes that M2 has a positive effect on house prices, because a loose monetary policy can 
increase housing demand. For the same reason, lending rates are expected to have a negative effect. 
In addition, government expenditure is often associated with an increase in spending in housing 
and hence expected to have a positive effect on house prices. The effect of exchange rates is 
uncertain. On one hand, appreciation in currency may attract foreign investment flowing to the 
housing market. On the other hand, the appreciation may also discourage foreign investors due to 
the increase in prices. This study also observes the effects of house prices on the macroeconomic 
variables. The effects of house prices on M2, lending rates, and government spending are expected 
to be insignificant. Huang et al. (2015) and Shen et al. (2016) illustrate that an increase in house 
prices often leads to monetary and credit growth; however, the Chinese government has not 
explicitly adjusted the monetary and fiscal settings for the housing market before 2017, and most 
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of the policy decisions are aimed to stimulate economic growth. Furthermore, house prices are 
expected to cause a depreciation in yuan. Housing can be viewed as a store of value for 
entrepreneurs; hence, when house prices decrease, entrepreneurs may shift their investments from 
housing to foreign assets, causing capital outflows and yuan's declines. 
 
4. Empirical results1 
4.1 Explanations about impulse responses 
 The VAR model describes the changes in variables as a linear function of their past values, 
so the model generates five linear equations whose dependent variables are HPI, M2, lending rates, 
exchange rates, and government expenditure, respectively. Because it is difficult to interpret the 
coefficients in the equations, we take a closer look at the impulse response functions, which 
describe the reaction of a variable to a shock in another variable over a time period. To understand 
how an impulse response is developed, we consider the equation of evolution with only one lag: 𝑦" = 𝐴𝑦".$ + 𝑒" 
 Again, 𝑦" is a  5×1 vector that collects all variables, and 𝑒" is the error term. Next, we can 
rewrite the one period lagged equation of evolution as follows: 𝑦".$ = 𝐴𝑦".% + 𝑒".$ 
 After that, we replace 𝑦".$ in the original equation of evolution to obtain: 𝑦" = 𝐴%𝑦".% + 𝐴𝑒".$ + 𝑒" 






	 𝑦" = 𝐴&𝑦".& + 𝐴%𝑒".% + 𝐴𝑒".$ + 𝑒" 
 From this, if we want to find the effect of the 𝑗-th element of the vector of shocks on the 𝑖-
th element of the vector two periods later, the effect is represented by the 𝑖, 𝑗 element of the matrix 𝐴%. One can notice that an impulse response is an induction process. 
 Figure 4 shows all the impulse responses generated by the VAR model. The error bands in 
each impulse response indicates the 95% confidence interval. The Monte Carlo simulation is used 
to generate the error bands. In this paper, this method estimates the error bands by calculating the 
results 500 times. The impulse responses are statistically significant if the confidence interval does 
not contain zero, namely the horizontal axis. In Section 4.2, I first analyze the effects of money 
supply, lending rates, and government expenditure on house prices. Then, I observe the impacts of 
house prices on the three variables. Lastly, I examine the impacts of exchange rates. 
 
4.2 Dynamic effects between macroeconomic factors and house prices in Beijing 
 The impulse responses show that both monetary policy actions and fiscal stimulus plans 
influence the house prices. As Figure 5 shows, a money supply shock has a positive impact on 
house prices, and the impact is borderline significant from the fifth to the ninth month. This result 
supports the findings from Tan and Chen (2013) and Koivu (2012) that money supply positively 
impacts house prices. A lending rate shock has a positive impact on house prices, but the impact 
is small and becomes statistically insignificant after three months. This positive impact contradicts 
the hypothesis that higher lending rates will tighten the borrowing constraints and thus decrease 
the housing demand. One explanation is that interest rates play an insignificant role in the housing 
market; as Tan and Chen (2013) mention, people will invest in the housing market regardless of 
whether the lending rates are high. While previous studies fail to rule out the effects of fiscal policy 
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on the housing market, this paper shows that a government spending shock has a positive impact 
on house prices, and the impact is borderline significant seven months after the shock. This result 
is consistent with the hypothesis that the increase in spending on housing triggered by a fiscal 
stimulus plan should push the prices up. The positive impacts of money supply and government 
expenditure suggest that when an expansionary monetary or fiscal policy is implemented, an 
increasing amount of funds will be directed to the housing market, because SOEs and individuals 
tend to invest in housing due to the high profit. Such capital flows inevitably result in an increase 
in house prices. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe the dynamic effects among money supply, 
interest rates, and government expenditure. As Figure 6 shows, a money supply shock has no 
significant impact on government expenditure, implying that China's fiscal policy is not attuned to 
its monetary policy. Similarly, the money supply shock has no significant effect on lending rates, 
contradicting the expectation that monetary growth is often associated with a loose monetary 
policy that leads to reductions in interest rates. Likewise, a lending rate shock has no stable or 
pronounced impact on money supply. The unexpected interaction effects between money supply 
and lending rates suggest that the money supply and the interest rate may be considered as separate 
tools rather than complementary monetary instruments in China. 
 Figure 7 shows the impacts of house prices on China’s monetary policy. The impulse 
responses show that a house price shock has no significant effect on money supply, which 
contradicts the finding from Koivu (2012) that money supply is reduced after a shock in residential 
prices. Meanwhile, the house price shock has no significant impact on lending rates; this result 
contradicts the findings from Shen et al. (2016) that a housing boom often causes an easing of 
credit constraints. The weak responses of the monetary variables to the house price shock implies 
that there is a partial unilateral relationship from monetary policy and housing market. In fact, 
28	
	
instead of monetary policy actions, the Chinese government frequently raises the down payment, 
restricts purchases of multiple homes, and bans the sale of homes to people who have no household 
registration, namely the hukou, which determines where Chinese citizens can live. The lack of 
attempts to curb house prices through monetary policy actions explains the weak responses of the 
monetary variables to the housing market. Similarly, a house price shock has no pronounced effect 
on government expenditure; China's fiscal policy is barely affected by the housing market. 
 This paper complements other studies by considering the influence of exchange rate 
movement on house prices. The impulse responses in Figure 8 show that a depreciation in the yuan 
has neither statistically nor economically significant impact on house prices, which is in line with 
the results from Liu and Hu (2013) and implies the exchange rate pass-through into house prices 
is weak. Similarly, a house price shock has no statistically significant impact on exchange rates. 
The weak response of house prices to exchange rates can be explained by the ambiguous 
relationship between the yuan and the housing market in the recent decade. Before 2015, Although 
China was believed to attempt to devaluate its currency, the yuan was in fact appreciating and 
moving from 7.8 in 2008 to 6.1 in 2014 against the dollar. Meanwhile, house prices rose drastically 
between 2008 and 2014; that is, the surging house prices were accompanied by an appreciation in 
yuan. However, when the yuan was experiencing a depreciation in 2016, China's house prices still 
showed signs of increase in top-tier cities until restrictions on housing demand were imposed. The 
inconsistent reactions of house prices to exchange rates lead to the patterns found in the impulse 
responses of exchange rates and house prices. Interestingly, one impulse response reveals that a 
yuan’s decline leads to a decrease in money supply at one month, although the decrease is only 
borderline significant. This is consistent with the expectation that the PBOC tends to refrain from 
cutting the RRR and increasing the money supply when the yuan depreciates. 
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 Lastly, a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) is implemented to aid in the 
interpretation of the VAR model. The variance decomposition tells how much of a change in a 
variable is due to its own shock and how much due to shocks to other variables. Table 6 shows the 
variance decompositions of all variables in the VAR. Surprisingly, a shock to house price accounts 
for above 84.24% of variation in house prices at one year. That is, most of the variation in house 
prices is due to its own shock. The belief that housing is a safe investment and the prevalence of 
speculation in the housing market explain why variation in house prices is mostly caused by its 
own shock. Since the shocks to other variables only account for small variation in house prices in 
the short run, I only observe the variance decompositions at one year. The results show that a shock 
to money supply accounts for 8.3% of variation, which is the largest among all variables except 
the house price variable. Likewise, a lending rate shock accounts for 1.74% of variation, and a 
government spending shock accounts for 5.56%. These results suggest that Beijing housing market 
is more sensitive to changes in money supply than changes in interest rates or fiscal policy. In 
contrast, a shock to exchange rates accounts for only 0.14% of the variation, suggesting that the 
housing market is more sensitive to policy changes than exchange rate movements. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1 Replacing Beijing house price data with Shenzhen house price data 
 Only observing the Beijing housing market may not be sufficient to conclude the impacts 
of monetary policy on the general housing markets in China; thus, I conduct a robustness check 
by constructing another VAR model using Shenzhen house price data instead of Beijing house 
price data. While Beijing was one of the first postindustrial Chinese cities and is the headquarter 
of most of China’s largest state-owned companies, Shenzhen was one of the fastest-growing cities 
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in the world during the 1990s and the 2000s due to China’s economic reforms and is a major 
financial center with active private entrepreneurship and prosperous domestic high-tech firms. 
Figure 9 shows the changes in Shenzhen house prices between 2006 and 2016. While the increase 
in Shenzhen house prices was moderate before 2015, the increase accelerated abruptly in 2015. In 
fact, Shenzhen home prices rose the fastest in China in 2016; prices in Shenzhen, Shanghai, and 
Beijing rose 41.25 percent, 22.5 percent, and 15.47 percent year-on-year in July (Glenn, 2016). 
Another VAR model is developed by a similar approach to observe the house price fluctuations in 
Shenzhen. Nevertheless, while the HPI for Beijing is stationary, the ADF test suggests that the 
HPI for Shenzhen is non-stationary as shown in Table 4; therefore, the differencing technique is 
applied, after which HPI becomes stationary. Table 5 shows the results of the lag selection for the 
second model. In this case, both FRE and AIC suggest using a lag length of three. 
The second model generates a set of impulse responses shown in Figure 10, illustrating the 
reactions of variables to different shocks in Shenzhen. Although both the first and the second 
models agree that a house price shock has no significant impacts on either monetary variables or 
exchange rates, several results in the second model are not in line with those in the first model. 
First, a money supply shock has a positive impact on house prices in Shenzhen, but the impact is 
smaller than that in Beijing and becomes statistically insignificant after one month. Second, a 
lending rate shock has a significant negative effect on house prices from the second to the seventh 
month, suggesting that tightening the credit market will cause a decrease in the housing demand 
in Shenzhen. Third, a government spending shock has no significant impact on house prices, 
contradicting the hypothesis that an expansionary fiscal policy causes increases in housing demand 
and investment due to the increase in available funds. These results imply that although money 
supply has a positive impact on house prices, the impact varies in different cities. 
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Similarly, the second model provides the variance decompositions. As table 7 shows, the 
variance decompositions at one year reveal that a shock to house prices accounts for 67.31% of 
variation in house prices. This result suggests that most of the variation in Shenzhen house prices 
is also due to its own shock; however, the shocks to other variables account for a sizeable amount 
of variation in this case. A shock to money supply only accounts for 0.75% of variation, meaning 
that changes in money supply has a smaller impact on Shenzhen housing market than Beijing 
housing market. However, a lending rate shock accounts for 27.49% of the variation, which is 
significantly higher than the percentage of variance that the lending rate shock accounts for in 
Beijing. To sum up, while the housing market in Shenzhen is also mainly influenced by the 
expectation that house prices will rise, the market is much more sensitive to lending rates. 
Meanwhile, while the impacts of money supply and government expenditure on Beijing house 
prices are significantly positive, they become insignificant in Shenzhen housing market. 
The differences between the housing markets in Beijing and Shenzhen can be explained by 
the different characteristics of the cities. First, because most of the largest SOEs are located in 
Beijing, the impacts of money supply and government expenditure on house prices are more 
pronounced in Beijing since SOEs have more access to funds. In addition, as Huang et al. (2015) 
argue, local amenities such as air quality impact house prices. Beijing is known to be a city with 
serious air pollution; the World Health Organization (WHO) database in 2011 mentioned in Huang 
et al. (2015) shows that Beijing is the fifth most polluted city within the country. While most of 
the polluted Chinese cities are in the north, the south remains in relatively better condition. Since 
Shenzhen is near the least polluted southern city, the air quality in Shenzhen is perceptibly better 
than that in Beijing. As the WHO database in 2016 shows, the annual mean of PM2.5, namely the 
level of air pollution, in Beijing was 85 in 2014, and the annual mean in Shenzhen was 34. Huang 
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et al. (2015) assert that housing markets in cities with better amenities are less sensitive to 
monetary and credit growth, suggesting that a money supply shock accounts for less variation in 
Shenzhen house prices when the air quality in Shenzhen is consistently and noticeably better than 
that in Beijing. Furthermore, because Shenzhen has been a fast-growing city that attracts high- and 
low-skilled workers from around China over the last few decades, Shenzhen is one of the most 
crowded Chinese cities, which had a population density of 6,000 people per square kilometer in 
2016, compared with 1,300 in Beijing. Both cities also differ in income levels. For example, per 
capita GDP in Shenzhen was 163,750 yuan in 2016, compared with 114,742 yuan in Beijing. Both 
the population density and levels of income imply that the housing demand in Shenzhen is stronger 
than that in Beijing over the last few years. The robust housing demand in Shenzhen strongly 
encourages speculative behaviors in the housing market. Because speculative investors are more 
sensitive to changes in lending rates, a lending rate shock accounts for more variation in Shenzhen 
house prices. To sum up, while money supply has a positive impact on house prices, the impact 
varies due to institutional differences and different levels of amenity. 
 
5.2 Replacing M2 money supply with CPI 
 As mentioned before, CPI is not included in either the first or the second model, because 
CPI is highly correlated with M2. Including both CPI and M2 in a VAR model results in a problem 
with multicollinearity, which disrupts the development of the model and the interpretation of the 
variance decompositions. In other words, the VAR model may attribute the fluctuations in house 
prices to the changes in CPI, while the house prices are in fact influenced by M2. Although both 
models above exclude CPI, CPI is used for robustness checks in this section. I replace M2 with 
CPI in the previous VAR models to investigate whether the impacts are consistent with those of 
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the original models. In the interest of clarity, I denote the model that uses Beijing HPI and M2 as 
Model 1, the model that uses Shenzhen HPI and M2 as Model 2, the model that uses Beijing HPI 
and CPI as Model 3, and the model that uses Shenzhen HPI and CPI as Model 4. 
 The CPI variable differs from the M2 variable in that CPI is stationary; therefore, the 
differencing technique is not used for CPI. Instead, CPI is transformed into natural logarithm to 
help with the interpretation of the VAR models. After replacing M2 with CPI, I first use the HPI 
in Beijing to develop Model 3 and investigate the impacts of CPI and other variables on Beijing 
housing market. As Table 8 shows, both FPE and AIC suggest using two lags for Model 3. 
 Figure 11 shows all the impulse responses in Beijing housing market produced by Model 
3; most impulse responses resemble the patterns of those in Model 1, although most of the impacts 
become statistically insignificant. For example, a CPI shock in Model 3 has a positive impact on 
house prices, but the impact is statistically insignificant and much smaller than that of a money 
supply shock in Model 1. Likewise, a government spending shock in Model 3 has a positive but 
economically and statistically insignificant impact on house prices, while the shock in Model 1 
has a significant positive impact. In addition, a lending rate shock in Model 3 has a significant 
negative effect on house prices after nine months. while the shock in Model 1 has a negative but 
statistically insignificant impact in the long run. The comparison between the impacts of lending 
rates complements the results of Model 1, emphasizing that a cut in lending rates is likely to 
decrease house prices in the long run. Furthermore, Model 3 agrees with Model 1 that a house 
price shock has no significant effects on money supply, lending rates, or government expenditure. 
Also, there is no relationship between exchange rates and house prices in Model 3. 
 Next, Model 4 is constructed after the M2 variable in Model 2 is replaced with the CPI 
variable. Table 9 shows that both FRE and AIC suggest using three lags. Figure 12 shows all the 
34	
	
impulse responses generated by Model 4. Again, most impulse responses are similar to those in 
Model 2. For example, in Model 4, a government spending shock has no significant effect on house 
prices, and a lending rate shock has a significant negative impact on house prices from the second 
to the eighth month. However, a CPI shock has a significant negative impact on Shenzhen house 
prices from the fourth to the eighth month, which contradicts the finding from Model 2 that a 
money supply shock has a small significant positive effect on house prices. The unexpected effect 
of a CPI shock emphasizes that Shenzhen housing market is more sensitive to lending rates. 
Moreover, M2 and CPI should not be viewed as variables that are perfectly substitutable; thus, the 
impact of a CPI shock is inevitably different from that of a money supply shock. While an increase 
in money supply directly provides individuals and firms with more loans that can be invested in 
the housing market, an increase in CPI has no direct impact on housing demand. 
 
6. Policy implications 
6.1 Tighten money supply and credit 
 The results of the VAR model show that money supply has a positive impact on house 
prices; thus, curbing the increase in money supply is expected to suppress the growth of the 
housing market. As mentioned before, a money or credit expansion in China allows the SOEs to 
access more loans from banks. Most of the loans will be invested in the housing market, driving 
the land prices as well as the house prices. Tightening the money supply and controlling the funds 
flowing to the SOEs can reduce the incentives of those inefficient firms to invest in the housing 
market. Meanwhile, because the Chinese government gives priority to the SOEs, the privately-
owned enterprises (POEs) need to rely on informal financial intermediaries, such as shadow banks. 
That is, the expansionary monetary policy also shifts the capital out of POEs, which are considered 
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more productive than the SOEs. This argument is in line with Chen and Wen (2014) who illustrate 
that a housing bubble can crowd out productive investment. Hence, shifting the capital from the 
SOEs to the POEs can alleviate the problem with capital misallocation while curbing the house 
prices. As Chang et al. (2016) illustrate, the reallocation of resources accompanied by the reduction 
in money supply and the tightening of credit will also raise the total factor productivity (TFP), 
which raises real GDP in Chinese economy. Moreover, Lien et al. (2016) mention that the wage 
gap between high-skilled and low-skilled workers is shrinking, because high-skilled industries are 
not favored by the government's investment strategy. Improving the POE sector can increase the 
demand for high-skilled workers; as a result, unemployment rates for educated individuals decline, 
and people have a greater incentive to attain higher education degrees. 
In addition, Chen and Wen (2014) explain that the vacancy rates of residential homes in 
the first-tier, second-tier, and third-tier cities in China are 21.2 percent, 21.8 percent, and 23.2 
percent respectively, implying that the supply is supposed to be accommodating the demand in the 
housing market. However, a homeowner's entrepreneurial status, namely whether the homeowner 
owns a private business, has strong predictive power on the vacancy rates of residential homes in 
China. That is, entrepreneurs are more likely to own vacant housing units than other types of 
homeowners do. Because housing is a tempting investment option, the government needs to avoid 
excessive speculative behaviors in the housing market. As the previous impulse responses show, 
house prices are more sensitive to lending rates in Shenzhen where speculative activities in the 
housing market are believed to be more prevalent; therefore, adjusting the interest rates may reduce 
the speculative activities and hence the house prices. Moreover, the Chinese government ended its 
administrative control of interest rates in 2015; thus, the interbank money market is expected to 




6.2 Reallocation of resources 
 China’s leaders asserted that urbanization was the powerful engine to drive economic 
growth (Davis, 2013), reducing constraints on migration and urban registration; consequently, 
rapid urbanization and demographic changes are prevalent in China. A growing number of people 
who live in undeveloped rural regions or second- and third-tier cities migrate to first-tier cities, 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, in search of better education, health care, and job 
opportunities. The increases in population size in major cities inevitably drive the demand for 
housing, causing a rise in house prices. Because the demand in major cities is more robust than 
that in second- or third-tier cities, when new housing construction is speeding in most cities, the 
strong demand in major cities leads to higher house prices, whereas the weak demand in small 
cities lead to higher vacancy rates. If some people are willing to move to second- or third-tier cities, 
the increase in house prices is likely to slow down in major cities, and vacant housing units in low-
tier cities can be consumed. Encouraging people to move to small cities require reallocation or 
resources; the government should support more developments in lower-tier cities.  
Income growth also leads to surging house prices; nonetheless, the income growth is 
unequal for the rich and the poor (Talley, 2015). It is conceivable that low-income households 
suffer more from the growing house prices than high-income households do; as Chen and Wen 
(2014) point out, middle- and high-income households are driving forces for house prices, whereas 
low-income households are excluded from the housing market due to the unaffordable prices. 
Likewise, Yao et al. (2014) argue that China has two divided housing markets: commercial 
housing for the rich and low-cost housing for the poor. However, only one-third of new urban 
residential buildings were low-cost houses in 2012; a growing number of houses were built for 
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wealthy people, because low-cost housing was highly unprofitable. The shortage of low-cost 
housing raises the prices of low-cost houses, causing low-income households to compete for 
commercial houses rather than low-cost houses. It is feasible that when the government supports 
low-cost housing, the housing market will be more efficient, and house prices will fall. 
 
6.3 Problems with curbing house prices 
Whether to control house prices is a dilemma for the PBOC. On one hand, the problems 
with credit risks and overcapacity may force the PBOC to refrain from increasing money supply 
or releasing fiscal stimulus packages, so investment in property market will fall. On the other hand, 
the PBOC may consider keeping high economic growth by allowing investment in the property 
market. Since the share of investment in GDP is high in China, one can argue that the willingness 
of the Chinese government to forgo high GDP growth is influencing the house prices.  
 Since China's economic growth is tied to the housing market, the PBOC may be reluctant 
to curb house prices. Firstly, If the PBOC reduces money supply and tightens credit, even though 
capital can be shifted from SOEs to POEs, such reallocation is a gradual process. Secondly, as 
Lien et al. (2016) state, increasing spending on low-skilled sectors can deliver fast and visible 
output results. These two arguments suggest that the Chinese government is tempted to direct 
capital into physical infrastructure and housing to achieve high GDP growth. Improving the POEs 
may foster long-run economic growth, but such economic growth is not immediate. It takes time 
for POEs to develop and for high-skilled workers to be employed in these POEs. Before the 
transition from SOEs to POEs completes, China's economy may experience weak output growth 
and a high unemployment rate, which the Chinese government intends to prevent. 
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 Moreover, although the impulse responses in the study find that house prices have no 
significant impact on exchange rates in recent decade, it is uncertain whether a fall in house prices 
will cause a yuan's decline after 2016 when China's economic growth is expected to slow down. 
At the end of 2016, the exchange rate of Chinese yuan to one US dollar was 6.94, which fell to 
nearly eight-year low. If this depreciation continues, China’s economy will experience severe 
capital outflows again. It is conceivable that a housing market that underperforms will signal a 
pessimistic economic outlook that discourages housing investment and decreases the demand for 
the yuan. When housing is no longer an attractive investment opportunity, investors are likely to 
sell off their properties and transfer their money to foreign assets. If a decrease in house prices 
speeds up the depreciation in currency, then the PBOC may be reluctant to suppress house prices. 
It is possible that the PBOC will maintain the current level of house prices to attract local and 
foreign investment to stabilize the exchange rate fluctuations. Again, the willingness of the 
government to forgo high GDP growth may influence the performance of the housing market. The 
government needs to make prudent policy decisions when facing the surging house prices. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 Because China's housing market and monetary policy are believed to influence each other, 
this paper studies the interaction effects and the causality between house prices and money supply 
in China. In particular, I observe the housing market in Beijing. Because house prices in Beijing 
are notoriously high and conceivably sensitive to policy changes, the housing market in Beijing 
can be considered as a representative of the housing markets in top-tier Chinese cities. With 2006-
2016 monthly data on house price indices in Beijing, M2 money supply, lending rates, exchange 
rates of Chinese yuan to one US dollar, and government expenditure, a VAR model is constructed. 
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The impulse responses show that M2 money supply has a significant positive impact on house 
prices from the fifth to the ninth month, whereas house prices have no significant impact on money 
supply. In addition, while a lending rate shock has no economically significant effect on house 
prices, a government spending shock has a significant positive effect on house prices after seven 
months, suggesting that fiscal stimulus plans also contribute to the growth of the housing market. 
Meanwhile, there is no pronounced relationship between exchange rates and house prices. After 
observing the impulse responses, I conduct the variance decomposition to aid in the interpretation 
of the VAR model. The results show that in the long run, a shock to money supply accounts for 
8.3% of variation in house prices, and a shock to lending rates accounts for 1.74% of variation. 
Also, a shock to government expenditure accounts for 5.56% of variation, suggesting again that 
China’s fiscal policy also influences the housing market. Meanwhile, a shock to house prices 
accounts for 84.24% of variation, indicating that most of the variation in house prices is due to its 
own shock. To sum up, although monetary and fiscal policy changes, such as an increase in money 
supply or government spending, play important roles in the housing market, the expectation that 
house prices will rise is the major cause of house price fluctuations. 
 After that, two robustness checks are conducted. First, I develop another VAR model by 
replacing Beijing house price data with Shenzhen house price data. Several results of the second 
model are different from those of the first model. For example, although house prices in Shenzhen 
increase after a money supply shock, the increase is smaller than that in Beijing and becomes 
insignificant after one month. However, a lending rate shock has a significant negative impact on 
Shenzhen house prices from the second to the seventh month. In fact, the variance decomposition 
shows that in the long run, a money supply shock accounts for only 0.55% of variation in Shenzhen 
house prices, while a lending rate shock accounts for 27.49% of variation, indicating that Shenzhen 
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house prices are much more sensitive to changes in lending rates. These results show that although 
there is evidence that money supply has a positive impact on house prices, the impact can vary due 
to institutional details and the level of amenity of a city. Furthermore, the second robustness check 
replaces the M2 variable with the CPI variable in both models. Although statistically insignificant, 
most of the impulse responses resemble those of the original models. 
 To curb the house prices, the government can tighten money supply and credit constraints 
and reallocate resources. However, suppressing house prices causes a tradeoff between short-run 
economic growth and an efficient housing market. Although reducing money supply can 
conceivably lower house prices, China's economic growth is likely to slow down when capital is 
being transferred from the SOEs to private sectors. Moreover, a decline in house prices may 
accelerate the yuan depreciation, because investors would rather invest in foreign assets than 
purchase houses in China. Nonetheless, reducing investment in housing induces reallocation of 
capital, which increases productivity and fosters long-run economic growth. The PBOC needs to 
make prudent monetary policy changes when intervening in the housing market. 
 Several limitations in this paper should be mentioned. First, a sample size of 127 may not 
be sufficient. The results will be more reliable if data spanning from earlier time period to the 
present is available. Second, although the unstructured VAR model in this study shows that a 
money supply shock has a positive impact on house prices, the impact is inaccurate if a monetary 
policy action is purposeful and responds endogenously to the state of the economy. A structural 
VAR model may provide more reliable results for this study, because it can distinguish endogenous 
monetary policy actions from exogenous ones and ensure that the changes in house prices are due 
to monetary policy rather than other factors. Third, a cointegration test is needed to check whether 
a VAR model is the optimal choice for this study. If cointegration proves to be present between 
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the variables, a vector error correction model (VECM) might be a better option. Fourth, the impacts 
of monetary policy on Beijing house prices and Shenzhen house prices are different. It remains to 
be seen which of the two housing markets is a better representative of the housing markets in 
Chinese first-tier cities. It may be worth observing more housing markets in different Chinese 
cities to reach a more convincing conclusion about the relationship between monetary policy and 
house prices. One can improve this study by taking these issues into account. 
 In addition to examining various housing markets in first-tier Chinese cities, further 
research can also focus on the house price fluctuations in second- and third-tier cities, which also 
experienced rapid growth of house prices over the last few years. For example, based on the data 
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, while prices in Beijing and Shenzhen rose 22.7 
percent and 41.4 percent in July 2016 when compared with the prices in the preceding year, 
second-tier cities Nanjing and Hanzhou rose 34.9 percent and 19.1 percent. Compared with first-
tier cities, second- and third-tier cities have fewer migrant workers and a smaller population size; 
therefore, one can argue that the housing markets in those cities are less sensitive to policy changes 
due to the weaker housing demand. Further research is needed to analyze whether a spillover effect 
exists in China's housing markets. When the housing stocks in first-tier cities are exhaustive, home 
buyers and speculative investors may shift their investments to housing in lower-tier cities. It is 
worth investigating the impacts of house price fluctuations in first-tier cities, as well as the impacts 
of monetary policy actions, on the housing markets in second- and third-tier cities. 
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7. Tables and graphs 
Table 1: Mean, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum of variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
      
HPI 132 159.8 39.43 100 264.9 
M2 132 828735 379731 303572 1.550e+06 
Lending rate 132 5.840 0.820 4.350 7.470 
RMB to 1 USD 132 6.739 0.572 6.051 8.065 
Government spending 127 49950 41891 1871 175768 
CPI 132 120.8 11.01 99.40 137.2 
      
Note: HPI is the house price indices in Beijing. HPI and CPI are the converted values where the 







Table 2: Results of augmented Dickey-Fuller test (The stationarity test) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Test statistics 1% CV 5% CV 10% CV p-value Lags 
       
HPI -3.519 -3.500 -2.888 -2.578 0.0374** 4 
HPI in log -4.559 -4.031 -3.446 -3.146 0.0012*** 4 
M2 -2.166 -3.500 -2.888 -2.578 0.5091 4 
M2 differences -5.549 -3.500 -2.888 -2.578 0*** 4 
Lending rates -2.916 -3.500 -2.888 -2.578 0.1572 9 
Government 
spending 
-4.131 -3.503 -2.889 -2.579 0.009*** 0 
Government 
spending in log 
-6.205 -3.503 -2.889 -2.579 0*** 0 
Exchange rates -3.928 -3.500 -2.888 -2.578 0.0018*** 0 
CPI -3.842 -4.034 -3.447 -3.147 0.0146** 12 
       
* indicates significance at 10% level of significance 
** indicates significance at 5% level of significance 






Table 3: Results of lag length selection for the VAR model of Beijing housing market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lags LL LR df p FRE AIC HQIC SBIC 
         
0 -1341.74    74663.9 25.4101 25.4611 25.5358 
1 -548.459 1586.6 25 0 0.037837 10.9143 11.2198 11.6681* 
2 -490.821 115.29 25 0 0.020501 10.2983 10.8585* 1106803 
3 -458.183 65.258 25 0 0.017893 10.1544 10.9691 12.1645 
4 -428.328 59.711* 25 0 0.016572* 10.0628* 11.1321 12.7011 
       






Table 4: Results of augmented Dickey-Fuller test for HPI in Shenzhen (The stationarity test) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Test statistics 1% CV 5% CV 10% CV p-value Lags 
       
HPI -2.488 -4.032 -3.447 -3.147 0.3339 6 
HPI differences -3.365 -3.501 -2.888 -2.578 0.0122** 2 
       
* indicates significance at 10% level of significance 
** indicates significance at 5% level of significance 






Table 5: Results of lag length selection for the VAR model of Shenzhen housing market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lags LL LR df p FRE AIC HQIC SBIC 
         
0 -1389.64    184362 26.314 26.365 26.4397 
1 -596.661 1586 25 0 0.093951 11.8238 12.129. 12.5776 
2 -530.284 132.75 25 0 0.043173 11.0431 11.6032* 12.4251* 
3 -499.261 62.046 25 0 0.03884* 10.9295* 11.7442 12.9396 
4 -474.465 49.593* 25 0.002 0.039576 10.9333 12.0026 13.5716 
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Figure 3: Exchange rate movement between 2006 and 2016 
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Figure 5: Impacts of monetary and fiscal variables on house prices 
 
    
 
 




   
 
 















Table 6: Variance decompositions of house prices in Beijing 
(1) (2) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Month HPI in log M2 differences Government 




      
1 1 0 0 0 0 
2 0.992997 0.000599 0.005329 0.001012 6.3E-05 
3 0.972646 0.003778 0.016832 0.004953 0.001792 
4 0.944209 0.013336 0.029932 0.0092 0.003323 
5 0.9186 0.026398 0.039314 0.012488 0.0032 
6 0.901351 0.040758 0.041952 0.013519 0.002421 
7 0.888112 0.054719 0.042736 0.012538 0.001895 
8 0.878372 0.065814 0.043636 0.010625 0.001552 
9 0.870148 0.073777 0.04564 0.009092 0.001343 
10 0.861428 0.079129 0.049015 0.009174 0.001254 
11 0.852195 0.082147 0.052622 0.011769 0.001267 
12 0.842378 0.083462 0.055354 0.017434 0.001373 
       




Figure 9: Changes in Shenzhen house prices between 2006 and 2016 
 
 





















01jan2006 01jan2008 01jan2010 01jan2012 01jan2014 01jan2016
Month





Table 7: Variance decompositions in Shenzhen housing market 
(1) (2) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Month HPI in log M2 differences Government 




      
1 1 0 0 0 0 
2 0.981137 0.007345 0.006162 0.001157 0.004198 
3 0.947078 0.006236 0.005661 0.032731 0.008294 
4 0.910768 0.00803 0.005444 0.06604 0.009718 
5 0.861393 0.008675 0.006308 0.114868 0.008757 
6 0.813518 0.008047 0.006884 0.162091 0.00946 
7 0.765868 0.007547 0.007958 0.208482 0.010146 
8 0.727896 0.007351 0.012879 0.240139 0.011736 
9 0.701992 0.007757 0.016984 0.260342 0.012925 
10 0.685884 0.007621 0.022219 0.271244 0.013032 
11 0.676649 0.007514 0.028053 0.274837 0.012948 
12 0.673056 0.007521 0.031622 0.274927 0.012874 
       







Table 8: Results of lag length selection for the VAR model of Beijing housing market using CPI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lags LL LR df p FRE AIC HQIC SBIC 
         
0 66.5275    2.2e-07 -1.15005 -1.09942 -1.02515 
1 993.541 1854 25 0 1.0e-14 -18.0101 -17.7063 -17.2607 
2 1072.24 157.4 25 0 3.8e-15* -19.0138* -18.4569* -17.64* 
3 1096.92 49.353 25 0.003 3.9e-15 -19.0078 -18.1977 -17.0094 
4 1120.79 47.755* 25 0.004 4.0e-15 -18.9868 -17.9235 -16.3639 
       






Table 9: Results of lag length selection for the VAR model of Shenzhen housing market using CPI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lags LL LR df p FRE AIC HQIC SBIC 
         
0 -341.965    0.000479 6.5465 6.59742 6.67213 
1 429.922 1543.8 25 0 3.6e-10 -7.5457 -7.24018 -6.79189 
2 473.298 86.751 25 0 2.6e-10 -7.89241 -7.33229* -6.51043* 
3 499.541 52.487* 25 0.001 2.5e-10* -7.91587* -7.10115 -5.90573 
4 516.879 34.676 25 0.094 3.0e-10 -7.7713 -6.70198 -5.13299 
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